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REFLECTIVE PRACTICE

Philanthropy, Evaluation, Accountability,
and Social Change
John Bare, Ph.D., The Arthur M. Blank Family Foundation

Key Points
· Many foundations have substituted process accountability for accountability for contributing to
social change.
· While process accountability is important, it sets a
floor, not an aspirational ceiling.
· There are tools—such as risk analysis, systems
approaches, and game theory—that can help
philanthropy engage in work on complex social
problems that cannot be deconstructed into a
series of small, linear projects.
· Seeking to extend basic human rights to more
individuals around the world, seeking to reduce
racism in a given city, or seeking to change publichealth norms in small town—all of these aspirations require first a willingness to take on challenges that defy short-term, causal, quantifiable results
attributable to a best practice.

It is time to acknowledge that philanthropy’s accountability movement is something other than
what is advertised.
All foundations know the accountability checklist. Avoid self-dealing. File your 990 on time.
Pay the excise tax. Be transparent about your
grant processes. Avoid excessive compensation.
Avoid luxury perks for board members. Commit
to board development. Do not bully nonprofits.
Keep administrative costs low. Have HR establish
annual performance reviews for individual staff
members. Benchmark internal processes against
those of other foundations. Seek cause-and-effect
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attribution regarding quantitative outcome targets for grants.
What is missing is an explicit recognition that
this set of behaviors is about setting a floor for
minimum standards. Treated as such, it is a
useful thing. It is useful in the same way that the
American Bar Association’s Code of Professional
Responsibility defines the minimum standards
lawyers must meet on ethics but does not describe what it takes to be a great, world-changing
attorney. Every profession or field needs agreedupon minimum standards. Fall short of these
minimums, expect to get dinged.
Yet for several reasons, philanthropy has treated
the accountability movement as so much more.
Attentiveness to accountability is sometimes offered up as a sufficient indicator of impact. These
foundations point to their internal accountability
efforts as evidence of a commitment to effectiveness, despite the fact that funders can hit the
mark on every accountability measure and still
contribute nothing of external value to society.
This bait-and-switch is convenient. It allows
foundations to define success through internal
metrics, not whether their social investments
generate any transformative value for society.
For foundations, it is always easier to show success on bright-line measures of accountability—
and take credit for success—than to pursue an
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ambitious social change agenda, where definitions
(much less measures) of success are murkier.
When all else fails, it is easy enough to lower the
standard used to define success, as states seem to
have done under No Child Left Behind (de Vise,
2007; Sturrock , 2007; Wallace, 2007). Accountability, in the end, is about defining the minimum
level of acceptable performance, not the highest
level of accomplishment we want to pursue.

Setting the Norm
As a field of practice, philanthropy has begun to
use the accountability movement to establish a
norm for what sound philanthropic investments
should look like. This is where the serious harm
can occur. The accountability movement requires
that the norm be closer to the floor than the ceiling. Foundations become locked into the notion
that philanthropic investments must carry shortterm, unambiguous revelations of causal attribution. Simple, linear tools are sufficient to manage
and evaluate these efforts.
This is a narrow view of what is possible. Within
these limits, foundations are less likely to invest
human or financial capital in complex change
agendas, where outcomes are far removed from
current interventions. The distance between
today’s investments and tomorrow’s outcomes, of
course, deprives current investors of the opportunity to take credit for any good that may occur.
The ability to take credit is a key component of
the accountability movement.
Adhering to the accountability movement requires foundations to avoid social change agendas
where outcomes cannot be easily quantified and
where problems are too large for any one funder
to produce. Accountability means being able to
carve out the unique contribution of any individual funder, an impossibility in long-term, complex
change efforts.
When foundations apply accountability tools to
their grant-making approach, the tail ends up
wagging the dog. Internal process draws more
attention than external impact. In the same way,
research shows that factory workers react to daily
production targets by calibrating their effort, so
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as not to work too hard or too fast, in an effort to
get the most pay out of the least work. The effect
is to tamp down production (Surowiecki, 2005).
For foundations, when they attempt to deconstruct complex social change agendas to create
bite-size, measureable grant projects—those with
quantifiable measures and easy attribution—the
foundations lose contact with the larger purpose
of their work. As Peter Block (2008) writes in
challenging us to think differently about community transformation, we cannot assume that
“an aggregation of individual changes” will add up
to large-scale change. “The mindset that we can
program and problem-solve our way into a vision
does not take into account the complexity and
relational nature of community,” Block writes.

When foundations apply
accountability tools to their grantmaking approach, the tail ends up
wagging the dog. Internal process
draws more attention than external
impact.
Further, foundations investing through an accountability model find themselves using fidelity to process and plan as the determination
of success. It is the same way in business: The
accountability movement has distracted firms
from the work of producing a great product or
service. Instead, meeting the internal process
metrics becomes the strategy itself, and it easily
becomes corrupted (Hymowitz, 2005a; Hymowitz
2005b). This is a great irony, and failure, of the
accountability movement. Despite all the rhetoric
about impact, the real tests are about compliance
to process. And linking rewards to progress on
short-term, tactical targets, especially financial
goals, “causes people to game the system and in
doing so destroy value,” Harvard business professor Michael Jensen (2003) writes in a paper, “Paying People to Lie”:
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The accountability movement’s obsession with
fidelity to process can be traced to the rise of
standardized processes that powered mass
production, which was organized by the “measuring and coordinating of all of the activities of the
manufacturing plant so that the speed and efficiency of these activities could match the speed
and efficiency of the machines themselves” (Head,
2003, emphasis added).

Philanthropy’s overreaction to
and overuse of tools anchored
in the accountability movement
have deprived foundations and
nonprofits from approaches that
can better help them produce
complex social change outcomes.
What George Eastman did for mass producing
photographic film, what Henry Ford and Frederick Winslow Taylor did for mass producing
automobiles, and what James Buchanan Duke did
for mass producing cigarettes all required precise
control over and accountability to standardized activities. When this accountability model
is transferred to fields of medicine or customer
service, the test is not about better outcomes. The
test becomes fidelity to process, for example, physicians following “decision-making algorithms”
designed by process engineers working for insurance companies. The effect is to “subordinate the
skills” and judgment and creativity of a professional to “an industrial, assembly line discipline”
(Head, 2003).
In philanthropy, this aspect of the accountability movement shows itself with human-service
organizations being forced to serve both the requirements of the funder and the needs of their
client families. When teaching an evaluation
class for nonprofit executives, I had one woman
explain that her organization had a foundation

86

grant to deliver health services to low-income
families. The funder required all grantees to
adhere strictly to the preferred implementation
model. To keep their funding, grantees had to
deliver detailed reports to the funder describing how they were following the model. For this
executive, however, her staff had discovered
that they could get better results by varying the
model based on the needs of client families.
Varying the model was not permitted. To keep
the funder happy while also pursuing authentic
social change for client families, the organization
decided to keep two sets of books. The group
used one set of reports to satisfy the evaluation requirements of the funder. The second set
of books accurately tracked the work and the
outcomes.

The Challenge at Hand
The central thesis is this: Philanthropy’s overreaction to and overuse of tools anchored in the
accountability movement have deprived foundations and nonprofits from approaches that can
better help them produce complex social change
outcomes.
One result of this pathology is that philanthropy’s leaders have come to define success,
and effectiveness, as being in compliance with
minimum standards and not in violation of an
expressed operational prohibition. This condition is at times a source of frustration and at
times a convenient dodge for those seeking to
aim for the floor and claiming to have reached
the ceiling.
The good news: At hand is a more robust collection of tools that enable foundation and nonprofit executives to pursue, manage, and evaluate
complex social change strategies as they unfold
in real time. Following a discussion of the rise of
the accountability movement, this article offers
eight such tools. The set of tools offered here is
intended to be generative, not exhaustive, and
intended to be used in tandem with accountability tools, not in place of them. The appropriate
solution is to fit the right tools to the right jobs,
addressing issues of minimum compliance and
aspirational social change.
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In the discussions below, the examples are assembled from a variety of fields of work. This is
intentional, so as to illustrate how the sweeping
accountability movement became so dominant
that its management and evaluation practices
were easily the tools of choice for foundation
and nonprofit executives. Likewise, as useful
alternatives become evident in various fields, it is
appropriate for philanthropy to take note. Amassing lessons from multiple fields of practice is a
reminder of the power of borrowing and adapting
tools already deployed for other uses.

A Larger Cultural Movement
Office Space, the 1999 Mike Judge film, shines
light on the accountability movement that has
dominated American life, certainly far beyond
philanthropy.
In a key scene, Ron Livingston’s character, Peter
Gibbons, meets with two consultants—evaluation
consultants, in effect—who are on site to interview staff ahead of layoffs. In describing the management at his firm, Gibbons explains that he has
eight different bosses, with each waiting to jump
on him if he makes a mistake:
Eight, Bob. So that means that when I make a mistake, I have eight different people coming by to tell
me about it. That’s my only real motivation is not to
be hassled, that and the fear of losing my job. But you
know, Bob, that will only make someone work just
hard enough not to get fired.

nents stay ready to pounce on any misstep or flaw.
In our politics, we are left with a constant state of
tit-for-tat charges that creates a continual cycle
of investigation and accusation. Success, again, is
equated with no one spotting any mistakes that can
lead to a “gotcha” moment. Given that humans are
flawed, mistakes are inevitable. Thus success can
only be achieved by doing nothing. So in practice,
individuals most likely to succeed in the accountability movement tend to be managers who maintain their position while doing as little as possible.

In our politics, we are left with a
constant state of tit-for-tat charges
that creates a continual cycle of
investigation and accusation.
Success, again, is equated with no
one spotting any mistakes that can
lead to a “gotcha” moment. Given
that humans are flawed, mistakes
are inevitable. Thus success can only
be achieved by doing nothing.

The scene reveals two critical shortcomings of the
accountability movement. First, by articulating
the minimum performance standard, it motivates
individuals only to clear the lowest acceptable
bar. Sports psychologists (Stevenson, 2006), for
example, know that the threat of punishment for
poor results, a key aspect of the accountability
movement, “generally isn’t the most effective
way to motivate someone.” Second, the culture
equates success with avoiding (or at least hiding)
mistakes. Both variables inhibit the pursuit of
ambitious, long-term efforts to transform society.

Then-Vice President Al Gore appeared on David
Letterman’s late-night show on Sept. 8, 1993,
to poke fun at this “gotcha” culture, which he
believed was inhibiting the federal government’s
ability to improve the social condition. To point
out the folly of federal procurement regulations,
Gore put on protective eyeglasses and used a hammer to smash a glass ash tray. In a scene that could
have come from Office Space, Gore explained that
government rules said ash trays “should break
into a small number of irregular shaped pieces
not greater in number than 35” (Gruber, 2003).
Gore’s point: With so much time and money spent
monitoring the nature of ash tray breakage, it is a
wonder anything substantive gets done.

The Office Space scene is a dramatic illustration of
the “gotcha” element of our culture, where oppo-

Gore’s effort, formally known as the National
Partnership for Reinventing Government, had
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Figure 1

Annual “Accountability” and “Social Change” Mentions in the NYT, 1981–2008

an ambitious mission. President Clinton (1993)
explained that the effort would “make the entire
Federal Government both less expensive and
more efficient, and to change the culture of our
national bureaucracy away from complacency and
entitlement toward initiative and empowerment.
We intend to redesign, to reinvent, to reinvigorate
the entire National Government.”
In the end, Gore failed to move political and
media classes away from the accountability culture and onto more substantive issues facing the
ountry. As shown in Figure 1,1 the accountability
movement continued in ascent after 1993. This
content analysis provides a quick way to observe
the degree to which the national conversation has
been focused more on accountability or more on
social change agendas.
Back in 1981, the first year of the analysis, the
terms “accountability” and “social change” received
1

Graph was created using the “Advanced Search” function
at the New York Times Web site, http://query.nytimes.com/
search/alternate/query?query=&st=fromcse. For each year,
1981–2008, I carried out separate searches for the term
“accountability” and a search for the term “social change.”
The Times Web site reports a total number of stories or
articles that include at least a single mention of the term in
question. The count reported is a tally of the total number
of stories or articles that include the term in question. The
term in question may appear once or more in each entry.
The Web site search was current as of June 19, 2009.
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about the same number of mentions in the New
York Times. Since then, “accountability” has dominated the national conversation. Through two Iraqi
wars, an impeachment trial of a president, a failed
presidential vote-counting system, and the rise of
digital media, there has been a rise in the number
of proclamations of accountability and charges of
failure to maintain accountability. The more nuanced idea of “social change” has not yet become a
substantial part of the national conversation.

It Turns Out Everyday Life Is Complex
There is a place for the accountability movement, of
course. It is well-suited to the clarity associated with
minimum standards, such as a ban on foundation
self-dealing. And every field, philanthropy included,
needs agreed-upon minimum standards. These are
the non-negotiables, the lines we shall not cross. Yet
as much as we need these bottom-line standards,
these are only a necessary component of a strong
philanthropy sector. We also need to challenge ourselves to pursue greater and higher aspirations than
are defined by accountability regulators.
As with any instruments, accountability tools can
be overused. Figure 1 shows this almost certainly
is the case here. As the accountability movement
has become dominant, the associated management and evaluation practices have been applied
in almost every setting without regard to whether
the tools ideally are suited to the situation.
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A telltale buzzword is “simple.” The accountability
movement thrives on the notion that everything
can be reduced to a simple, linear approach. In
general for the business world, the term “complexity” equates to bloated, wasteful operating inefficiencies (Ashkenas, 2007). There is no acknowledgment of the need to differentiate behavior to suit
the complexity of the system in which an individual
is working. Complexity is viewed as a problem to
remedy, not as a characteristic of a system.
Some people have challenged this conventional
wisdom. University of Michigan business professor Karl Weick (Coutu, 2003) urges leaders to
be skeptical of ideas presented as simple. This is
because we are operating in a world that is quite
complex, and “leaders must complicate themselves in order to keep their organizations in
touch with the realities of the business world. My
worry when executives say, ‘Keep it simple, stupid,’ is that they’re underestimating the complexity of their own organizations and environments.”
Comparing dominoes to pick-up sticks helps
make the distinction. Constructing a traditional
logic model is akin to setting up a string of dominoes, where knocking over a single domino sets
off a chain reaction and topples every subsequent
domino in succession. The string may be long and
may even be elaborately designed. But the system
is always linear and simple. And as with any
simple logic chain, we can always pinpoint which
input (i.e., which domino) must topple to produce
a specific output (i.e., the next domino in the
line). Each output then becomes the input for the
next connection in the line of falling dominoes.
Here accountability rules may fit well.
On the other hand, consider the game of pick-up
sticks, where each player in the game attempts
to remove a single stick from the pile without
moving any of the other sticks. This is closer to
real life, where interconnections make it difficult
to touch one aspect of public life without affecting another. In fact, we can make the game even
more real. Imagine the game where every player
is moving sticks at the same time. Now it is nearly
impossible to predict exactly how the pile will
move. We are left with little or no horizon for
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planning, as each player in the game moves sticks
whenever they want.
In this volatile setting where linear planning approaches do not carry much value, what we need
are robust tools that emphasize a continuous
cycle of feedback and rapid adjustment.
Dominoes places a premium on a very precise
plan. Winners are those who do the best job of
designing and sticking — exactly — to the plan.
Dominoes greatly reduces, and may even eliminate, uncertainty.
Precise plans do not carry much value in the
real-world version of pick-up sticks. Here winners
are those who can most rapidly harvest, process,
and act on feedback, in real time. To achieve great
results in complex situations where the world
around us is messy and unpredictable, we have to
adapt as we go. In complex situations there is no
chance of eliminating uncertainty. The best we
can do is reduce uncertainty.
Foundations investing through an accountability
model are essentially limiting themselves only to
problem-solving opportunities that line up neatly
like a chain of dominoes. Or they ignore the complexities of the issues confronting them and force
an overlay of simple tools and interventions. In
either case, the effect of the accountability model
is to limit the benefits that accrue to society.

What Works? Versus What Works, for
Whom, Under What Circumstances, for
How Long?
The Obama administration is contributing to the
myth that we can impose simple processes on
complex situations. First Lady Michelle Obama
reinforced the bias in announcing the $50 million
White House Social Innovation Fund: “The idea
is simple: to find the most effective programs
out there and then provide the capital needed to
replicate their success in communities around
the country that are facing similar challenges”
(Hrywna, 2009).
The truth is it is not so simple. In response to
President Obama’s recommendation to put
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federal funding behind a single program (presumably, in the First Lady’s words, the one program
deemed “the most effective”) to help mothers
with young children, four experts published a
letter to the White House arguing for a more
flexible approach. The authors are Deborah Daro,
research fellow at University of Chicago’s Chapin
Hall; Ken Dodge, Duke University professor of
public policy; Heather Weiss, founder of the Harvard Family Research Project; and Edward Zigler,
emeritus professor of psychology at Yale.

In truth, there are no universal
“what works” answers, at least when
the programs involve human beings.
They are evaluators focused on the impact of
government and foundation interventions. These
experts are not soft touches. Their public position serves as proof that acknowledgment of
complex systems does not equate to a post hoc,
wait-and-see approach ready to declare whatever
happens as a relevant outcome. The experts here
argue for an approach that they believe would
touch more children and families with more
good outcomes:
The President’s decision to invest in home visitation
for newborns represents an important public policy
choice and one we fully support and applaud. The
proposed strategy for building this new system, however, gives us cause for concern. We do not believe
the current structure of this policy will achieve maximum impacts and benefits for the next generation of
young Americans (Daro et al., 2009).

The quartet’s central objection is one that needs
to be raised across government policy and philanthropy: That there are no one-size-fits-all solutions to complex social issues. The accountability
movement’s inclination to codify “what works”
and then require the approved protocol to be applied universally has led to the misuse of results
of randomized trials and resulted in the failure to
maximize impacts.
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In truth, there are no universal “what works”
answers, at least when the programs involve human beings. Instead, sophisticated experimental
designs yield evidence on what tends to work for
whom, for how long, under what circumstances,
and so on. Every first-year methods student
knows this. Yet these qualifications are dropped
when accountability champions, including the
White House, look to use evaluation results to
select a single “what works” program to implement across the board. Those seduced by the
apparent simplicity of the accountability movement somehow dismiss Campbell’s (Cook and
Campbell, 1979) questions of external validity in
their entirety.
Here is how the Daro-Dodge-Weiss-Zigler letter
explains problem:
An underlying requirement of the President’s home
visitation initiative is that it contains only models
that have been proven effective through randomized
clinical trials. We do not disagree with the unique
role such trials can play in identifying promising
interventions and new policy opportunities. Randomized control trials offer some assurance that investments made in a given policy direction will have
desired impacts on program participants and generate short- and long-term savings. However, knowing
that a program is capable of achieving effects under
ideal conditions is not the same as knowing it will
achieve effects when broadly implemented with more
challenged populations or in more poorly resourced
communities. In the real world, the success of a
home visitation program will depend on how local
parents from all points on the risk continuum view
early intervention services, what service and provider
characteristics will attract new parents into these
programs, and the relation between these efforts and
other elements within a community’s existing service
continuum.
In many respects the core features of a well-done
randomized trial—a highly specified intervention,
consistent implementation, and a specific target
population—limit the ability to generalize its findings
to diverse populations and diverse contexts. Contrary
to what some have suggested, we know of no evaluation scholar who would conclude that randomized
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trials provide sufficient insight for making program
replication decisions.
The single model reflected in the President’s proposal
(Nurse Family Partnership) is an outstanding home
visitation program and has been proven effective in
achieving several outcomes suggestive of potential
cost savings. These outcomes, however, have been
largely limited to young women who enrolled in
services early in their first pregnancy. Although some
of the participants present significant risks that work
against good parenting practices including young
maternal age, low income, single parent status, and a
range of mental health challenges, as a group they do
not fully represent populations often found to dominate public welfare caseloads nor those reported
for maltreatment, areas where the current proposal
hopes to achieve significant long-term savings. Based
on the 2006 birth data available from CDC, a unique
focus on first-time parents would leave about 62
percent of newborns ineligible for service (about
2.7 million births). Further, infants in the foster care
system are eight times more likely than other infants
to have mothers who received no prenatal care—a
reality that would have precluded these women from
accessing Nurse Family Partnership.
Fortunately, other well-researched home-based
interventions have been found effective in achieving positive outcomes with these more troubling
populations, and they have accomplished their
objectives without employing nurses. The concept of
early home visitation is being taken to scale in many
communities across the country, some of which
have invested in a model similar to that proposed by
the President while some follow other models such
as Parents as Teachers, Healthy Families America,
Home Instruction for Parents of Preschool Youngsters, Parent-Child Home program and Early Head
Start. These efforts have been studied by multiple
investigators, and the findings have been used to improve program structure, staff training, and outcome
documentation. In developing the parameters for the
President’s proposal, we would encourage you to give
careful attention to this full body of research.

Another telling example comes from Dr. Jerome
Groopman and Dr. Pamela Hartzband (2009),
both Harvard Medical School faculty and on
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staff at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center in
Boston. They describe the misuse and overuse
of bright-line accountability practices. As they
explain in the Wall Street Journal, tools suited to
minimum standards do not work when applied to
complex medical situations where every patient
needs to be considered individually.
At the outset, the doctors acknowledge the
positive power of accountability metrics. Recent
federal projects designed to improve Medicare
quality have had positive effects. Imagining a hospital “as a large factory where systems needed to
be standardized to prevent avoidable errors,” new
protocols and guidelines regarding hand washing
have reduced patient infections.
As part of the regulatory oversight, doctors who
not comply with the new guidelines draw negative
public recognition and suffer financially. This is
an important and relentless force within the accountability movement: Not following the plan is
what is punished.
However, what worked with hand washing may
not work so clearly with more complex clinical
care decisions. Groopman and Hartzband (2009)
explain that regulators reviewed competing approaches to medical care and decided to mandate
that hospitals keep blood-sugar levels within a
very narrow range among ICU patients. This
became a metric on report cards that judge performance of hospitals and doctors—and thus one
criterion by which punishments and rewards were
meted out. Keeping the blood-sugar levels within
the narrow range would be rewarded. Varying the
care would draw serious punishment.
Yet now studies show more patients are dying
when their blood-sugar levels are tightly controlled. Patients receiving more flexible care do
better. The “what works,” it turns out, depends on
the conditions of the patient. Cookie-cutter accountability solutions that work well on minimum
standards, such as with hand washing, are not
robust enough to work with more complex issues.
The case shows “why rigid and punitive rules to
broadly standardize care for all patients often

91

Bare

break down,” Groopman and Hartzband write,
pointing to Orwell and Kafka as models for today’s accountability regulators:
Human beings are not uniform in their biology.
A disease with many effects on multiple organs,
like diabetes, acts differently in different people.
Medicine is an imperfect science and its study is also
imperfect. Information evolves and changes. Rather
than rigidity, flexibility is appropriate in applying
evidence from clinical trials. … And what is best
sometimes deviates from the norms. Yet too often
quality metrics coerce doctors into rigid and illadvised procedures.

Differentiating Between Simple,
Complicated, and Complex Systems
Foundations and nonprofits are continually urged
to adopt leading practices from the business sector. So philanthropy should take note when Harvard Business Review publishes an article (Hall
and Johnson, 2009) asserting that “the movement
to standardize processes has gone overboard.”
Joseph Hall and Eric Johnson, faculty members
at Dartmouth’s Tuck School of Business, have
figured out what many foundation and nonprofit
staff have felt in their gut: In many settings flexible processes yield better results than standardized processes. Moreover, “process standardization can undermine the very performance it’s
meant to optimize.”
This runs counter to more than 100 years of practice, largely driven by the Industrial Revolution’s
launch of modern manufacturing technology. As
Hall and Johnson report, by tradition “management calls for blindly reducing variability.” Six
Sigma programs and management training worldwide teach and reward process standardization.
Yet the authors contend that individuals should
be able to recognize when there is volatility in the
environment and volatility with inputs or outputs
(or both). In these cases, processes require more
“art” than science.
Consider the authors’ story about Ritz-Carlton
executives, who traditionally required staff to
follow precisely a 20-point checklist on customer
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service. That is classic accountability, with the
focus on compliance—following the checklist—
and not the ultimate satisfaction of customers. In
2006 Ritz-Carlton executives figured out this rigid
approach was no longer sufficient. The nature
of their guests, and thus their guest needs, was
varied. Expanding the customer-service script was
deemed impractical. In its place, staff was encouraged to “use their judgment and improvise,” basing
their service on a unifying set of corporate values.
Instead of rewarding employees for following
a predetermined script (“always carry a guest’s
luggage”), the new system rewarded employees
for their ability to figure out, understand, and
respond to guests’ specific needs. In the end, RitzCarlton guests gave higher marks for customer
service.
Hall and Johnson zero in on exactly what is required to move beyond the accountability movement’s minimums to take on more ambitious
social change efforts: recognizing that different
types of systems require different approaches.
The traditional simple, linear system is based on
a manufacturing model. If we change a gear or
alter the speed of an assembly line, it is easy to
predict how these changes will ripple throughout
the entire system. And if we run widgets through
the same system under the same conditions, we
are pretty certain of observing the same effects on
all of the widgets. Obsessive adherence to process
standardization is how companies such as CocaCola can efficiently produce millions of bottles
and cans of soda every day, with no unintended
variation.
Trouble arises when we transfer this approach to
systems involving human beings, each of whom is
different. As obvious as this may seem, philanthropy has struggled to move beyond simple, linear
logic models that assume social programs are
driven by precise gears and belts and that individuals running programs and receiving interventions
react as predictably as aluminum or steel.
In their 2006 book Getting to Maybe, Westley,
Zimmerman, and Patton (2006) force us to con-
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TABLE 1

Simple, Complicated and Complex Problems

Following a Recipe

Sending a Rocket to the Moon

Raising a Child

The recipe is essential

Formulas are critical and necessary

Formulas have a limited
application

Recipes are tested to ensure easy
replication

Sending one rocket increases
assurance that the next will be OK

Raising one child provides
experience but no assurance of
success with the next

No particular expertise is
required, but cooking expertise
increases success rate

High levels of expertise in a variety
of fields are necessary for success

Expertise can contribute but is
neither necessary nor sufficient
to ensure success

Recipes produce standardized
products

Rockets are similar in critical ways

Every child is unique and must
be understood as an individual

The best recipes give good
results every time

There is a high degree of certainty
of outcome

Uncertainty of outcome remains

Notes the quantity and nature of
“parts” needed

Separate into parts and then
reassemble and coordinate

Cannot separate the parts from
the whole; essence exists “in
the between” in the relationship
between elements

front this distinction by articulating the characteristics of simple, complicated and complex
systems (see Table 1).
The key here is the following: The more complex
the system, the less likely we can simply follow a
plan and expect any certainty in the outcome. The
more complex the system, the more important it
is to identify the right feedback sources and the
optimal frequency and nature of feedback.
It challenges our tradition of problem solving to
consider that success could ultimately depend
less on following a plan and more on tracking and
reacting to the right feedback systems. Traditional
problem-solving models tend to start with the
task of defining the problem and then hinge on
implementing the agreed-upon course of action.
Block (2008) explains that these models do not
easily accommodate ongoing feedback or changes
in the system during implementation.
To move beyond this, we should reconsider
even our everyday understanding of feedback.
We tend to imagine positive feedback as praise,
negative feedback as a scold. With a systems approach, however, feedback is the mechanism by
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which we affirm a decision or make a course correction. Negative feedback becomes an essential
tool in our effort to increase the likelihood of a
positive outcome. Negative feedback is neither
summative nor punitive. It is only an indication
that a change is needed. In the most basic example, consider a self-organizing, self-correcting
system, such as your home thermostat. This
system is based on negative feedback. The thermostat is set to react to extra warm air by making
things cooler. It reacts to extra cool air by making
things warmer.
To recognize the importance of feedback, we first
must be able to recognize the nature of the system
in which we are working. The key is to differentiate between simple and complex systems, as the
Getting to Maybe team urges. New York Times
columnist David Brooks, commenting on findings
from a longitudinal study tracking two groups of
men for nearly 70 years, recognizes this distinction. In describing how the study explains variations in the lives of the men, Brooks marveled
at the “stream of suggestive correlations” from
variables linked to health, happiness, and general
well-being. But more interesting to Brooks was
what the research could not simplify: “It’s the
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baffling variety of their lives that strikes one the
most. … There is a complexity to human affairs
before which science and analysis simple stands
mute” (emphasis added).

to decrease hospital infections was to mandate
hand washing.

Now, today, Gates is encountering a set of
global problems where the situation has flipped.
No longer is caring enough. Solutions are not
In much the same way, in his 2007 commenceevident. As Gates and other leaders shift their
ment speech at Harvard, Bill Gates (2007) was
attention to these types of complex social dilemexplicit about the need to adjust our approaches
mas, the accountability tools suited to problem
to suit the complexity of the issues before us:
solving a generation ago are less useful. Success
cannot be realized through following a plan or
All of us here in this Yard, at one time or another,
have seen human tragedies that broke our hearts, and implementing the agreed-upon set of activities. Uncertainty cannot be eliminated. Success
yet we did nothing—not because we didn’t care, but
because we didn’t know what to do. If we had known will depend on identifying and reacting to the
most powerful feedback variables — and making
how to help, we would have acted.
adjustments at each decision point that increase
the chances of contributing to some social
The barrier to change is not too little caring; it is too
change.
much complexity.
To turn caring into action, we need to see a problem,
see a solution, and see the impact. But complexity
blocks all three steps.

This central argument—that “the barrier to
change is not too little caring; it is too much
complexity”—represents a shift in American
thought.
A generation ago, Martin Luther King, Jr.’s (1966)
observation about our response to global population growth is notable for the differing point of
view. The problem “is soluble by means we have
discovered and with resources we possess. What
is lacking is not sufficient knowledge of the solution but universal consciousness of the gravity of
the problem and education of the billions who are
its victims.” This shift is critical to understanding
the value of the accountability movement, then
and now.
In situations where solutions are evident and
resources are at hand, where there is sufficient
knowledge, then bright-line accountability tools
are highly useful. When all that is required is
caring or consciousness, it is inexcusable not to
implement the remedy. This minimum standard
of performance can be enforced through accountability. Failing to meet the standard should draw
punishment. As an example, all that was required
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Education: A Case Study in Evaluation,
Accountability, and Social Change
Education, especially high school reform, is one of
the complex issues in the sight lines of the Gates
Foundation.
The challenge before the country—educating
millions of school children so that all reach their
potential—is more like our messy game of pickup sticks than toppling a chain of prearranged
dominoes. It is a volatile environment, where
everything is changing at once. Individuals
themselves arrive at school with diverse needs.
Individual students react differently to different
stimuli over time. Teachers, principals, and parents are in continual states of change. Students
are constantly subjected to changing outside
influences.
Despite these multiple moving targets, education has traditionally relied on an accountability
approach focused on minimum standards and
punishments for failing to clear the bar. Highstakes tests tend to be set up as pass-fail markers
for kids and schools. In some cases, students who
do not meet the minimum standard do not pass
a grade or graduate. With other tests, a predetermined share of student test takers must meet a
minimum score or else teachers, or perhaps the
entire school, suffer some punishment.
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Most notable is that all of these evaluation tools
provide feedback after the intervention has
come to a close. In short, the evaluation results
arrive at a moment when it is too late to make
any improvements, to make any changes. This
is the case with end-of-year report cards. Once
schools or students receive their final report
cards, there is very little anyone can do to act on
the information. As a result, education’s accountability approach does a terrific job of producing
snapshots of low performers, and then punishing
them. Yet the approach contributes little or nothing to bringing about large-scale social change
that would alter the course for these students and
schools.
In education, the accountability movement has
not produced social change. The deficiencies that
launched recent education reform models, and
the prior reform models, remain.

try demands bold, persistent experimentation. It
is common sense to take a method and try it. If it
fails, admit it frankly and try another. But above
all, try something.”

Social change efforts, in contrast
with the accountability movement,
greatly favor trying something,
anything, to disrupt the status quo.
Too often accountability models end
up reinforcing the status quo.

We see the same admonition from evaluator
Donald Campbell, whose essay “The ExperiWhat we are left with are stories like the ones Jay menting Society” (Campbell and Russo, 1999)
makes the case for what he calls action research:
Matthews (2009) tells. Matthews is the education reporter for the Washington Post and author “Faced with a choice between innovating a new
program or commissioning a thorough study
of a 2009 book on the KIPP charter school
of the problem as a prelude to action, the bias
model and its founders, David Levin and Mike
would be toward innovating.” Leaping in to act,
Feinberg.
of course, raised the importance of feedback,
which Campbell recognized through his call for
As new college graduates who entered the
“trial-and-error.”
classroom through Teach for America and not
through a traditional university education program, Levin and Feinberg were essentially insur- Social change efforts, in contrast with the acgents challenging the existing bureaucracy—and countability movement, greatly favor trying
something, anything, to disrupt the status quo.
thus challengers to the process standards of the
Too often accountability models end up reinforcaccountability system. Levin and Feinberg were
ing the status quo.
focused on authentic outcomes. For them, this
meant helping low-income elementary school
students in Texas learn and achieve so they could Accountability rewards following the plan or
script. If the outcomes are not realized, it is not
improve their lives. This meant the two teachers were highly flexible in what they would do to the fault of the individuals following the plan.
They followed instructions. Individuals are acbring about this result. In fact, they were willing
countable for following the rules established by
to try most anything — and did — to help their
whatever authority is managing the accountability
students.
system. Thus, Levin was poorly received because
he would not agree to teach the same way all the
Their commitment to social change recalls the
others were teaching. Levin found some faculty
value articulated by Franklin Roosevelt (1932),
“were openly hostile to him,” and once in the
who in a college commencement address made
the case for action, however flawed: “The country school parking lot his tires were slashed (Matthews, 2009).
needs and, unless I mistake its temper, the coun-
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At the time in Texas (1994), the driving force
in the accountability movement was the Texas
Assessment of Academic Skills test. The accountability movement set a minimum standard:
at each school, a predetermined percentage of
students from every racial-ethnic subgroup must
pass the test. If not, the school would receive a
negative rating, which would reflect poorly on the
principal. Levin had 11 low-performing students
in his class that were of particular concern to his
principal.
As Matthews tells the story: “The best way to
avoid an unsatisfactory rating,” Levin was told
by school staff, “was to exempt those 11 students
from taking the test”:
This could be done if their teacher or their parents
signed a statement saying that their language skills
were not adequate to take the test or that they had
learning disabilities that would make it unfair to
judge their progress by that exam. Levin was told to
fill out and sign the exemption forms. Other teachers
were doing the same. …
Levin refused to sign. … He wanted his students to
qualify for one of the magnet middle schools, which
he hoped would challenge them in the same way that
he had been challenging them. Some of the magnet
middle schools started in the fifth grade. If his fourth
graders took the TAAS exam and received good
scores, they had a chance to move to the magnet
right away.

Levin persuaded the parents of his students that
the children were ready to perform. So when
school officials bypassed Levin and asked the
parents to sign the form required to keep the kids
from participating in the TAAS exam, the parents
refused.
The results showed Levin had been correct to
focus on preparing his students, not on finagling
a way to avoid putting the school at risk of not
meeting the state standard. Levin wanted more
than loopholes to ensure minimum compliance.
He wanted social change. In the end, his students
performed wonderfully on the test, which kept
the school off the watch list.
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The reaction of the principal? He fired Levin. He
did so by making a big show of the firing during
class one day. The explanation: insubordination.
Insubordination may be the iconic symbol of the
accountability movement, as it articulates a punishment for not following the process standard
even when, in Levin’s case, an alternative approach yields the best result.
Although Levin’s response put him in the minority of professionals willing to challenge directly
the accountability bureaucracy, this characteristic
is a key indicator of an individual committed to
bringing about change. Foundations interested in
social change must invest in these types of individuals, these “transformed nonconformists.”
At the opening plenary of the 2009 annual conference of the Council on Foundations, Morehouse College President Dr. Robert Franklin
(2009) reminded several hundred foundation
staff in attendance that philanthropy cannot
advance social change by supporting current
practices. Drawing on quotes from Dr. King, he
said: “This hour in history needs a dedicated
circle of transformed nonconformists. The saving of our world from pending doom will come,
not from the action of a conforming majority,
but from the creative maladjustment of a transformed minority. Dr. King maintained there was
a difference between the social consequences
of conforming majorities and the creative and
redemptive maladjustment of the few who see
possibilities in every crisis.”
In the accountability movement, the “conforming
majorities” are those who put process compliance
ahead of social change. The idea of a “transformed
nonconformist” defining success as compliance
with accountability rules tilts toward oxymoronic. The accountability movement, almost by
definition, depends on an “conforming majority”
unwilling to question the orthodoxy.

Education Innovation: Evaluation for
Social Change
In education, blind compliance to process has
resulted in numerous examples of cheating, fraud,
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and data manipulation (Popham, 2006), always in
an attempt to avoid the punishments built into accountability systems as the response for not meeting a minimum standard.3 One of the most recent
examples comes from Georgia (Judd 2009), where
administrators at five schools are under investigating for changing students’ answers on tests
to improve overall school performance. Another
high-profile case has surfaced in Chicago, where
high schools were found to be counting students
as present, day after day, long after the students
had dropped out.
The reason for the cheating? The accountability model punishes schools for truancies and
absences. The Chicago Tribune (Ahmed, 2009)
reports that city schools already lose $18 to $20
million each year because students are missing
days. As with most accountability models, the
system is set up to report year-end statistics,
which affect annual funding decisions, but it is
not set up to improve or change the situation.
The accountability system is intended to count
students who drop out, not help teachers and
schools prevent students from dropping out.
“When you have that kind of pressure, human
beings tend to cheat,” says William Gerstein, a
high school principal. “There is a lot of incentive … to report students present on days they
missed.”
Unlike a thermostat, which responds to heat or
cold by providing resources to change the status
quo once the current situation becomes unacceptable, accountability systems simply identify
and punish performance outside the desired
range. Further, the model focuses only on a minimum standard: getting kids in the building long
enough to count them as present. The model does
not support a strategy to change the live of the
students.

Now consider a social change approach, one that
uses evaluation information in entirely different
ways. In Montgomery County, Maryland, public
school officials have adopted an evaluation approach to maximize social change. The approach
acknowledges education is a complex system
requiring robust feedback mechanisms during
the period of the intervention. This is because the
intervention itself may need to be modified while
is unfolding.

Unlike a thermostat, which responds
to heat or cold by providing
resources to change the status quo
once the current situation becomes
unacceptable, accountability
systems simply identify and punish
performance outside the desired
range.

Instead of waiting until the end of the school year
to report on a pass-fail statistic—at a time when it
is too late to change the course for the student—
Montgomery County is investing nearly $50
million a year on Edline, a data system that coordinates input from multiple sources and sends
real-time reports to parents and other stakeholders to quickly match kids to interventions.

In describing the system, the Wall Street Journal
(Hechinger, 2009) tells the story of Duane Wilson,
a high school senior in Bethesda. During the first
semester of his senior year, Duane was receiving low marks in several advanced placement
3
The Houston scandal over fraudulent dropout data was
courses. With the Edline system, as soon as the
one of the most high-profile examples of the last deteacher recorded one of Duane’s low grades, the
cade. For details, visit 60 Minutes II story from Aug. 25,
2004, “The ‘Texas Miracle,’” http://www.cbsnews.com/
data system automatically sent an e-mail message
stories/2004/01/06/60II/main591676.shtml, or NPR’s
to Duane’s mother. This was enough for Duane’s
March 25, 2009, story, “Scandal Surrounds Houston’s High
School Dropout Rate,” http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ mother to rally her son. Duane picked up his
story.php?storyId=4565125.
grades and gained acceptance to college.
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“Like a smoke detector sensing fire, a school
computer sounded an alarm,” the Journal article
explains. More than three dozen staffers continually look for emerging risks across the student
population. “Alerts of flagging performance come
from Edline and another data-driven tracking
system modeled after the one used by the New
York City Police. The warnings, often sent via
email, can spark immediate action, such as afterschool tutoring, study sessions and meetings with
families.”

These tools put a maximum on the
hard thinking that goes along with
identifying flaws and hazards in
the proposed strategy, as well as the
willingness to set up contingency
plans—triggered by tracking a set of
variables that can serve as warning
bells—and use them as conditions
warrant.
Unlike the traditional accountability models, the
system in Montgomery County does not punish early signs of low performance. The system
reacts to these signals by supplying additional
resources in an attempt to change the system,
to reverse the current direction. This type of
real-time feedback is already the underpinning of logistics-sector leaders FedEx, UPS, and
WalMart. Perhaps the closest parallel to public
schools, in fact, is the Harrah’s casino chain
(Levinson, 2001), which several years ago adopted a technology solution to providing sweeping, real-time feedback about every individual
customer engaged.
For the Montgomery schools, over the course
of an academic year there is no way to predict
which students will encounter which problems
at any particular moment, so education officials
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constantly monitor all key variables in the way
that meteorologists monitor variables on a hurricane. They do not know which intervention to
implement, for whom or when, until the real-time
feedback systems yield the relevant information.

Eight Tools for Advancing Social Change
There is much to be said for the notion that success hinges on fitting the right tool to the right
job. That applies here. Much of the frustration
foundations experience with evaluation efforts
can be attributed to the wrong tools.
One of the most common complaints, that the
evaluation reports arrive long after an initiative
has ended and too late to be actionable, goes to
the heart of the need to produce rolling, real-time
updates. A commitment to this type of feedback
is the only way to manage work occurring within
complex systems. Likewise, foundations seeking
to launch ambitious social change agendas are
frustrated when they are repeatedly confronted
with simple, linear logic models. Shoehorning the
information into the boxes on the page satisfies
a compliance step, but filling out the document
does nothing to strengthen the underlying logic.
Assuming a static environment, these models also
assume the foundation is the only player moving
pieces on the game board. Thus, the models hinge
more on an ability to predict the future than on
ability to receive and act on input in real time.
Anything that deviates from the predetermined
critical path—a rifle shot—essentially eliminates
any chance of success.
Below is a list of eight tools that enable foundations to work in a very different way. These tools
put a maximum on the hard thinking that goes
along with identifying flaws and hazards in the
proposed strategy, as well as the willingness to
set up contingency plans—triggered by tracking a
set of variables that can serve as warning bells—
and use them as conditions warrant. These tools
allow foundations to hedge, essentially creating
multiple opportunities for success.
The list is in no way exhaustive. There are numerous tools and services that support social change
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agendas. To identify these resources, foundations
should be aggressive in looking for practices outside the narrow field of nonprofit evaluation.
1. Risk Analysis
The basic questions in risk analysis are the following: (1) What is most likely to go wrong? (2)
For each potential hazard, what are the potential
consequences? (3) Considering both the probability of occurrence and the potential harm, what
are the highest priority risks to worry about?
(4) If these risks materialize, what will we do in
response?
Working through these questions, with foundation staff and grantees, allows for an honest conversation about the greatest threats to a strategy.
It is not acceptable to say that nothing will go
wrong. Things always go wrong. Always. Success
hinges on an ability to track variables that will
sound alarms—and agreeing on threshold levels
that will trigger the alarm—as risks emerge, enabling foundations to activate contingency plans
or alternative approaches waiting in the wings
(Bare, 2001).
Foundation and nonprofit staff are rarely asked to
be up front and candid about what is most likely
to go wrong. Making risk analysis a central part
of the work of philanthropy is the quickest way
to move from an accountability model to a social
change model.
2. Systems Approaches
Another quick way to move from an accountability model to a social change model is to use the
“Getting to Maybe” tool (shown in Figure 2) to
differentiate the system in which foundations and
nonprofits are working.
To fit the right tool to the right situation, it is
necessary to agree on the nature of the system in
question. When foundations and nonprofits are
implementing projects in a simple system, the use
of simple, linear accountability tools is the right
move.
When working in complicated or complex systems, however, foundations and nonprofits must
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select their tools accordingly. Before selecting
evaluation and management tools to deploy in
a given setting, determining the nature of the
system is the correct first step.
3. Testing Assumptions
Just like everyone tells the dentist they brush and
floss regularly, every foundation and nonprofit
staffer will report to an evaluator that they have
considered the assumptions on which their strategy is based.
In most cases this consideration has been carried
out superficially, if at all. Assumptions are our
blind spots. By definition, we cannot see our blind
spots. It requires extraordinary effort, and challenging input from multiple and varied sources,
to surface assumptions in an authentic way.
We all see the arrows between the boxes in a
simple logic model. In this kind of “if, then …” logic, each assertion within a chain of logic rests on
all kinds of assumptions not depicted literally in
the model. If the assumptions hold, of course, the
supposed logical connection between the boxes is
more likely to play out as planned.
For example, the logic model for a high school
math intervention may show a simple, causal connection between the time students spend in an
optional after-school tutoring and the students’
performance on the math portion of the school’s
standardized tests.
This rests on any number of assumptions: that
students have time to attend the tutoring session
(and do not have to be present at part-time jobs);
that students who sample the tutoring will like
it and come back; that students who stay after
school for tutoring (and miss the school bus)
can get transportation home; that the tutoring curriculum lines up with the content of the
standardized test; that there is a sufficient supply
of capable tutors; that students most likely to
perform poorly on the standardized test will elect
to consume the tutoring; and so on. Perhaps the
most basic assumption is that the absence of
tutoring itself is the barrier to students improving
their performance on the test. If underlying physi-
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cal or mental illness is diminishing the students’
learning experience, then the tutoring may miss
the mark.
Despite the fact that all of these assumptions do
not show up anywhere in the project’s logic model, the foundation may want to build in real-time
feedback systems to track variables associated
with these questions. Even though these are indirectly related to the initiative, a failed assumption
will do more to damage chances of success than
anything else. Repeated, ongoing testing of these
assumptions can provide the critical feedback to
monitor the needs of the initiative.
4. The Outside View
Dan Lovallo, a professor with the Australian
School of Business, and Daniel Kahneman, a
psychology professor at Princeton University and
Nobel laureate, published a 2003 article in the
Harvard Business Review that described a demon
for many foundations: “delusional optimism.”
The authors identify a set of organizational pressures and cognitive biases that routinely lead executives to inflate their forecasts, especially with
their own projects: “We overemphasize projects’
potential benefits and underestimate likely costs,
spinning success scenarios while ignoring the
possibility of mistakes.”
Because the source of the bias is embedded in the
way our brains process information, this is a difficult demon to overcome. Lovallo and Kahneman
(2003) deliver the remedy, what they call “The
Outside View.” This external view is necessary to
push back against the internal view, which is the
source of the delusional optimism.
Pursuing The Outside View requires us to do the
following:
• Select a set of past projects to serve as the
reference class.
• Assess the distribution of outcomes from projects in this reference class.
• Predict your project’s positioning the distribution.
• Assess the reliability of your past predictions.
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• Correct your intuitive estimate based on your
track record of forecasting.
5. Sensemaking
Karl Weick defines “sensemaking” as “the transformation of raw experience into intelligible
world views”:
What I’ve repeatedly noticed is that the people who
really get in trouble during these crises are those who
try to think everything through before taking any action. The problem with defining and redefining your
hypotheses without testing them is that the world
keeps changing, and your analyses get further and
further behind. …
Action, tempered by reflection, is the critical component. … Once you start to act, you can flesh out your
interpretations and rework them. But it’s the action
itself that gets you moving again. That’s why I advise
leaders to leap in order to look, or to leap while
looking. … In crises especially, leaders have to act in
order to think—and not the other way around. …
I usually urge executives to fight their tendency to
want to plan everything. Most plans are too specific,
and the details create the illusion that the plan grasps
everything that is going on and therefore can be
trusted. As a result, when you have a plan, you tend
not to look for things that disconfirm it. … The worst
aspect of plans is that they heighten the tendency to
postpone action when something unexpected happens (Coutu, 2003).

As would be expected, there is a precise list
of steps to take to undertake sensemaking. In
general, Weick encourages executives to adopt
the practices of “high-reliability organizations,” or
HROs, which have to find ways to perform at high
levels in volatile environments where unpredictable events make most planning processes useless. These practices include a constant focus on
signs of potential failure, even signs staff consider
as weak. Another practice: refusing to try to simplify complex situations.
6. Game Theory
Foundations are in the decision-making business.
Game theory is the science of strategic decision
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making. It follows that game theory is a useful
discipline for foundation professionals seeking to
increase the impact of their work.
A decision tree is a basic tool in game theory. In
many situations, foundation staff can use a decision tree to depict all the possible decisions, considering the moves the foundation might make as
well as moves others may make. This step alone is
useful in identifying all of the multiple routes to
success. While the foundation may be heavily invested in a single critical path, a decision tree can
make explicit all of the decision points along the
way. This helps illustrate all the courses of action
that could help, or hurt, the foundation’s chances
of success.
In a more sophisticated approach, the foundation may assign probabilities to each branch of
the decision tree, as the model depicts future
occurrences. This effort not only helps users identify contingency plans and alternative
courses of action, it helps users prioritize needs
and resources.
7. Scenario Planning
Scenario planning is perhaps the polar opposite of
linear, logic models where success relies on future
events playing out exactly as planned.

What do we need to do to be prepared to succeed
in these different conditions?
The energy company Royal Dutch Shell has been
a high-profile user of scenarios. On the firm’s Web
site, the company publishes narratives and video
versions of energy scenarios for the year 2050
(http://www.shell.com/home/content/aboutshell/
our_strategy/shell_global_scenarios/dir_global_scenarios_07112006.html). In one scenario,
named “Scramble,” the firm imagines a rapid
expansion of the coal industry as energy needs
explode globally without a coordinated response
by industrialized countries. With nations pursuing
their own independent approaches to developing
energy resources, global climate change needs are
ignored. By 2020, growing transportation needs
drive up interest in biofuels, which leads to a sharp
rise in food prices. By 2030, coal production has
reached its limit globally. By 2040, nations turn to
nuclear power, but the technology does not deliver
as expected. By 2050, consumers finally demand
serious energy efficiency measures.
In another scenario, named “Blueprints,” the firm
imagines a future where consumers and advocacy groups organize to pressure governments to
pursue alternative energy strategies. By 2020, this
slows demand for coal and pushes governments
to establishing and exploiting new, market-based
strategies to take alternative energy industries to
scale. By 2030, electric vehicles enter the mass
market. By 2050, the world is using about 26
percent less energy than if it had stayed with the
old course.

Scenario planning requires participants to imagine and construct a variety of possible futures.
This is not an effort to predict which future will
actually materialize. It is not a forecasting competition. Scenario planning requires an explicit
acknowledgment that the only thing certain about
Again, these are not forecasts. These are imagined
the future is that it will be different from today.
versions of how the world may unfold between
now and 2050. Whether the future materializes
Scenario planning forces us to imagine what
resources and strategies we may need to increase in line with either of these scenarios is not the
point. It is not a contest based on forecasting acour chances of success in a future that will be
something other what we are experiencing today. curacy. Instead, the exercise challenges executives
to imagine how dramatically their firms must
Whereas traditional planning processes have
change to succeed in the decades to come. Again,
users focusing on short-term variables within
the only certainty is that the future will not be like
their control, scenario planning shifts the focus
to macro-level variables outside of users’ control. today. What is required to succeed today is not
sufficient to succeed in the future. The status quo
Once users establish a number of variations on
will not hold. Here is how Shell describes its use
what the future may look like at a future date—
of scenario planning:
say, 10 or 15 years out—the question becomes:
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Shell uses scenarios to explore the future. Our scenarios are not mechanical forecasts. They recognise
that people hold beliefs and make choices that can
lead down different paths. They reveal different possible futures that are plausible and challenging. Our
latest energy scenarios look at the world in the next
half century, linking the uncertainties we hold about
the future to the decisions we must make today.

8. Documentary Methods
Through photography, written narratives, audio,
or video, the documentary method serves as a
powerful way to explain complex systems that do
not lend themselves to simple reports. Further,
the documentary products themselves provide
feedback in extraordinary ways. The information
carries great affect and influence, much more so
than a written report.
Further, because documentary products often
receive wide circulation, the delivery method
ensures that individuals who object to the information cannot ignore it or keep it secret. The
distribution systems help ensure documentary
products are broadly accessible. This empowers
consumers to invent and reinvent users for the
products. In effect, documentary products set
things in motion.
StoryCorps is a prominent producer of radio
documentaries today. StoryCorps (http://www.
storycorps.org/about) specializes in harvesting oral histories from everyday people, and the
organization trains users to collect the stories.
Through StoryBooths and MobileBooths, the
organization has created fixed sites for individuals to use around the country, as well as mobile
resources that travel from city to city collecting
stories. Within this general mission, there are
specific initiatives such as StoryCorps Griot,
dedicated to preserving the stories of African
Americans. The stories are archived with the
National Museum of African American History
& Culture.
In recent years, documentarians Michael Moore
and Ken Burns have helped raise the profile of the
medium. Moore’s documentaries draw audiences
to movie theaters. By shining light on issues other
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people often would rather not discuss, his projects have affected the national political debates on
gun control, health care, and economic inequities.
The Burns documentaries, which are distributed
primarily through public television, have helped
shape the cultural conversations on the Civil War,
baseball, and jazz.
When former eBay president Jeff Skoll launched
his philanthropic efforts, he started a firm, Participant Media, to advance his social change agenda.
Through feature films, documentaries and other
media products, he is able to engage millions of
users and advance complex ideas. Other methods
are not robust enough to reach such a large audience with such ambitious ideas.
Participant Media has managed several highprofile media projects to completion, including
Food Inc. and An Inconvenient Truth. Other efforts,
such as a documentary about the effect of AIDS
on a South African village, or Darfur Now, which
examines genocide, are included in the firm’s push
to move individuals to “social action” (http://www.
participantmedia.com/social_action.php).
The firm’s Web site profiles a long list of projects.
For each, the “social action” content provides a
list of “5 Things You Can Do Now.” Here is how
Participant Media describes its mission:
The company seeks to entertain audiences first, then
to invite them to participate in making a difference.
To facilitate this, Participant creates specific social
action campaigns for each film and documentary
designed to give a voice to issues that resonate in the
films. Participant teams with social sector organizations, non-profits and corporations who are committed to creating an open forum for discussion, education and who can, with Participant, offer specific
ways for audience members to get involved. These
include action kits, screening programs, educational
curriculums and classes, house parties, seminars,
panels and other activities and are ongoing “legacy”
programs that are updated and revised to continue
beyond the film’s domestic and international theatrical, DVD and television windows. To date, Participant has developed active, working relationships with
83 non-profits reaching over 20 million people.
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Participant Media’s approach blurs the line
between for-profit Hollywood projects and dogooder nonprofit efforts. It blurs the line between
entertainment and documentary. As would be
expected, it does not concern itself with accountability questions of whether its offerings fit neatly
into any traditional category. It is much more
concerned with authentic social change than
about short-term, tactical process metrics. In the
end, Participant Media’s approach is very much
like that of insurgent teacher David Levin. Participant Media will do whatever it takes to move
individuals to action.

Conclusion: A Call to Action
For foundations and nonprofits to increase the
impact of their collective investments, philanthropy’s leaders must expand their imaginations
and their toolkits.
In reimagining the work, philanthropy’s leaders
have an opportunity to take on complex social
change strategies without apologizing for the
lack of pound-your-fist-on-the-table certainty.
The field can leave that kind of certainty to the
accountability movement’s compliance tools,
which use bright-line measures to describe dollars
invested, dollars spent, the number of units of
services delivered, and the efficiency of implementing inputs. It is important to monitor adherence to minimums. It is just not enough.
Reimagining the work requires something else: It
means acknowledging that philanthropy cannot
deconstruct complex problems into a series of
small, linear projects and expect the sum of the
parts to add up to large-scale social change. Seeking to extend basic human rights to more individuals around the world, seeking to reduce racism
in a given city, or seeking to change public-health
norms in small town — all of these aspirations require first a willingness to take on challenges that
defy short-term, causal, quantifiable results attributable to a best practice. It is back to admitting
foundations are playing a game of pick-up sticks,
where everyone in the game is moving their sticks
at the same time. In volatile settings, with short
time horizons, linear plans that connect inputs to
outputs lose value as the underlying assumptions
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and conditions change. Foundations cannot generate outcomes by easily setting off a string of chain
reactions, like toppling dominoes.
Willing to reimagine the work in this way, foundation and nonprofit executives will discover a
new set of approaches and tools to support them
through the experience of “getting to maybe.” The
tools described here, and other tools that may be
adapted to complex settings, breathe new energy
into the work of philanthropy. Just as the imagination can redefine the work, new tools enable
philanthropy’s leaders to pursue, manage, and
evaluate their efforts in powerful ways.

Reimagining the work requires
something else: It means
acknowledging that philanthropy
cannot deconstruct complex
problems into a series of small,
linear projects and expect the sum
of the parts to add up to large-scale
social change.

The revelation, across all of the tools, is that foundation and nonprofit executives are freed from
making precise predictions about how the future
will play out, with success hinging on forecasting
exactly what future will unfold. Instead, emphasis
is placed on tools that inform and support decisions, at each step along the way, that create the
greatest opportunities for impact across many of
the possible futures. These tools assume a fixed
and unwavering commitment to the outcome and
a readiness to adapt and adjust in terms of what it
will take to produce the desired impact.
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